Background: "Second victims" are healthcare professionals traumatized by involvement in significant adverse events. Associated burdens, e.g., guilt, can impair professional performance, thereby endangering patient safety. To date, however, a model of second victims' experiences toward a deeper understanding of qualitative studies is missing. Therefore, we aimed to identify, describe, and interpret these experiences in acute-somatic inpatient settings.
T he term "second victim" was introduced by Wu (2000) , describing healthcare professionals traumatized via involvement in serious adverse events. 1, 2 Having unintentionally caused harm to patients ("first victims"), many consider these events as personal failures, losing their confidence as clinicians and professionals. 1, 2 However, in today's complex healthcare environments, eventual involvement in a serious adverse event is normal. 3 When adverse events-defined by their potential for harm 4 -affect patients, guilt, frustration, and fear can impair involved healthcare professionals' performance, further endangering patient safety. 3 Hilfiker (1984) 5 and Leape (1994) 6 highlighted human fallibility in medical settings; and in 2000, the U.S. Institute of Medicine published "To Err Is Human." 7 That report estimated that up to 98,000 persons died annually in the United States from medical errors, leading to associated expenses as high as US $29 billion. 7 Current estimates place the annual death relating to adverse events up to 440,000. 8 However, even these figures are questionable, many cases go unreported, because therapy-and disease-related harms are often indistinguishable. 9 Internationally, although patient safety is a global priority, the incidence rate of adverse events is 14.2 per 100 hospitalizations per year in high-income countries. 10, 11 From 2009 to 2017, review articles focused on qualitative and quantitative second-victim studies of varying explanatory power in the United States, Asia, and Europe. 3, [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] These indicated that second victims' experience intense emotional burdens (e.g., burnout and depression), impacting their personal relationships, their professional collaborations, their physical health, and even their institutions ("third victims"). 3, [12] [13] [14] 16 However, although supportive environmental conditions (e.g., support from colleagues) are beneficial, many institutional reactions simply compound the damage. 3, 13 Ideally, care teams and superiors support their affected colleagues, whereas their organizations ensure that supportive structures are embedded in their safety culture. 3, [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] Research has yet to identify how to relieve second victims' burdens while considering short-and long-term effects on safety culture. 3, 12, 15 Within healthcare organizational culture, safety culture reflects management and staff values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and behaviors regarding individual fallibility. 17 Therefore, security-promoting behavior depends not only on individual character but also on collectively shared values. 18 Although increasing numbers of differentiated, empirical studies illuminate second victims' experiences, no review article have systematically interpreted nor aggregated regarding theory formation and development. Moreover, shortages of theoretical associations often preclude in-depth understanding of interactions. Even though, e.g., Lazarus' stress model or Antonovsky's concept of salutogenesis help elucidate second-victim experience, e.g., by means of cognitive appraisals relating to stress or a jeopardized sense of coherence, 19, 20 yet no available model explains the overall second-victim construct.
Until now, strategies to maintain or improve patient safety have focused on affected patients. By shifting "from a personal to a systemic perspective," incident analyses and safety culture promotion become strategic pillars of patient safety. 21 Regarding healthcare priorities and lack of support for many second victims, 10, [12] [13] [14] 16 a model of their experience will, by increasing the visibility of the often neglected experiences of second victims, contribute to a higher level of awareness regarding this vulnerable group.
This qualitative metasynthesis is rooted in holistic thinking akin to pragmatism and aims to describe and interpret second victims' experiences in acute-somatic settings from this group's perspective. We approach experience as a learning process evolving and generating meanings between the individual and the context.
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METHODS
This qualitative metasynthesis follows the steps by Sandelowski and Barroso (2007) 25 : goal setting, literature search, evaluation of studies, classification of results, metasynthesis, and metasummary. The ENTREQ statement was used to ensure methodical rigour. 26 
Goal Setting and Literature Search
The SPIDER structure was used for goal setting and search string development (Table 1) , referring to the keywords associated with Boolean operators, which were used to search in PubMed, CINAHL, and PsycINFO without temporal limitations (September 27, 2016, update: December 23, 2016) . 27 In addition, we searched reference lists of included studies, other systematic reviews, study protocols, professional publications, dissertations, and monographs, and contacted authors (n = 22).
We included original German and English articles offering insight into second-victim experience based on qualitative designs and conducted interviews, predominantly of healthcare professionals in acute care inpatient settings. We excluded studies in other languages, nonoriginal articles, mixed-methods studies, nonresearch-based articles, and first-level interpretations (e.g., interview transcripts).
Evaluation of Studies
For the initial screening, the first and fifth author independently checked all titles and abstracts according to predefined inclusion criteria. Next, they read potentially relevant full texts. For both steps, interrater reliability was determined. 28, 29 We discussed discrepancies until we reached consensus.
For individual evaluation, following Sandelowski and Barroso's guidance, the authors read all included studies repeatedly with increasing attention to detail and wrote synopses of all. 25 For overarching conclusions, they tabulated and compared study evaluations. 25 
Classification of Results
The first author dichotomized the result sections of all included studies as first-or second-level interpretations and evaluated each one's methodology regarding design, sample, data collection, and analysis. 30 The fifth author verified 47% of these evaluations.
Metasynthesis
We performed an inductive qualitative data analysis using MAXQDA V.12.
31 "First-cycle coding" involved line-by-line micro-analysis of second-level interpretations of the included studies' results sections. 31 Via splitting, we grouped qualitative data into open, inductive single-word-or phrase-based codes.
31
"Second-cycle coding" differentiated categories by means of subcodes and codes. 31 This resulted in a conceptual model. 31 
Metasummary
To avoid underrating or overrating individual findings, we quantitatively aggregated qualitative data. 25 After extracting, paraphrasing, categorizing, and abstracting as parts of the metasynthesis described previously, we calculated via the following formulas by means of code frequencies, which results were the most frequent across the studies (frequency) and how much each study contributed to the analysis (intensity): 
Concepts Key Words Combined With Boolean Operators
Setting "acute care" OR "acute care setting" OR "acute care settings" OR "acute setting" OR "acute settings" OR "clinic" OR "clinics" OR "hospital" OR "hospitals" AND Population "healthcare professional" OR "healthcare professionals" OR "healthcare provider" OR "healthcare providers" OR "resident" OR "residents" OR "second victim" OR "second victims" AND Causes "adverse event" OR "adverse events" OR "adverse patient event" OR "adverse patient events" OR "error" OR "errors" OR "mistake" OR "mistakes" OR "patient harm" OR "patient harms" OR "patient safety event" OR "patient safety events" OR "patient safety incident" OR "patient safety incidents" OR "unanticipated outcome" OR "unanticipated outcomes" AND Evaluation "affected" OR "anger" OR "anxiety" OR "burnout" OR "coping" OR "depression" OR "distress" OR "emotional" OR "experience" OR "fatigue" OR "fear" OR "feelings" OR "frustration" OR "guilt" OR "impact" OR "meaning" OR "psychological" OR "safety culture" OR "sleep" OR "stress" OR "support" OR "traumatic" AND Design "content analysis" OR "ethnographic study" OR "ethnography" OR "grounded theory" OR "interview" OR "interviews" OR "interviewed" OR "phenomenological study" OR "phenomenology" OR "qualitative study" OR "thematic analysis"
Trustworthiness
To ensure our results' trustworthiness, we applied the descriptive, interpretative, theoretical, and pragmatic validity criteria by Sandelowski and Barroso. 25 The first author's in-depth familiarity with the second-victim issue contributed to his nuanced understanding of this subject. In addition, regular meetings within the research team contributed to this study's interpretative and theoretical validity. Furthermore, the comprehensive and systematic literature search, the metasummary, and the inclusion of studies with heterogeneous epistemiological bases strengthened the interpretative and theoretical validity. The research steps described previously further strengthened our results' descriptive and pragmatic validity. 25 
RESULTS
Included Studies
Evaluations of the chosen studies' titles and abstracts ( Fig. 1 ) involved 478 predominantly medical or nursing healthcare professionals of both sexes (n physicians = 325 and n nurses = 131) in American (n studies = 9), European (n studies = 8), and Asian (n studies = 2) hospitals. Despite diverse descriptions and definitions of adverse events, all focused on the healthcare professionals' response to actual or potential patient harm ( Table 2) .
Metasynthesis
Transactional Second-Victim Experience
Our metasynthesis outlined a transactional second-victim experience model (Fig. 3) . Vertically, this represents a system open to external influences, with mutual modulation between safety culture and healthcare professionals. Due to reciprocity, indicated by arrows, safety culture is both a central influencing factor regarding affected healthcare professionals and an end point.
Horizontally, iterative development begins with appraising the situation, extending first to restoring integrity, then continuing professional life. Between appraising the situation and restoring integrity, healthcare professionals weigh their internal and external resources. For example, they activate personal resources and receive assistance from colleagues via safety culture. 50 However, although second victims often need support urgently 2, 33, 39, [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] and search for "emotional relief valves," 36,50 they tend to deny themselves such support via undemanding or unreceptive behavior. 33, 35, 40, 42, 47, 49, 50 "Several claimed that they did not have any expectations about getting support because they had made a mistake, and therefore had to bear the consequences themselves. "
47(p321)
Safety Culture And Healthcare Professionals
Safety culture influences whether and to what extent healthcare professionals become second victims. 2, 37, 42, 44, [48] [49] [50] Acknowledgment of second victims' need for help is a first step toward overcoming the negative consequences of the "blame-shame culture" that dominates many institutions. 2, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 48, 50 Communicative processes are formative in a safety culture. For example, speaking to first victims can be therapeutic for second victims; however, emotional issues for both first and second victims can make discussions challenging. 33, 34, 36, [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] 47 Considering second victims' damaged professional confidence, they often share their feelings with friends rather than medical professionals. 2, 33, 34, [36] [37] [38] [41] [42] [43] 45, [47] [48] [49] [50] Although this informal support channel usually involves persons with no professional healthcare background, 34, 36, [47] [48] [49] [50] the advantage of disclosing one's inner feelings and preserving a perspective "from the outside" can outweigh the disadvantages. 2, 34, 36 Whereas professional assistance offers both trustability and a neutral perspective, it can also be associated with stigmatization. 39, 50 Although empathic and sympathetic team behaviors can benefit second victims, staying silent or minimizing an event can be regressive. 35, 40, 41, 49 Likewise, within a robust safety culture, superiors can use adverse events to imprint that culture via role modeling, 39, 47, 48 e.g., cultivating a trustful, systemic perspective on errors, and addressing informational needs, e.g., concerning support programs. 2, 38, 40, 45, 46, [48] [49] [50] "The respondents within this study suggested that none of these support systems are possible if there is not an organizational patient safety culture. "
50(p9)
Depending on the event's seriousness, second victims are often eager both to learn and to contribute to safety culture via root-cause Error is defined as "the failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve this aim."
"Near miss"
is defined as analyses (RCA). 36, 38, 40, 42, 43, 48, 49 As understanding and acting require readiness to learn, training and further education are vital not only to preventing adverse events but also to responding to their occurance. 34, 40, 45, [48] [49] [50] Healthcare professionals respond similarly to different events, based on their seriousness. 2, 34, 36, 37, 41, 42, 49, 50 In the conflict between expectation and reality, personally experienced responsibility is of major importance for many second victims. 33, [35] [36] [37] [38] 42, 44, 46, 49 Reactions can also depend on personal traits, e.g., self-efficacy, resilience, perfectionism or professional experience, spirituality, and sex aspects. 2, 34, 38, 39, [41] [42] [43] [48] [49] [50] For example, as a result of a perfectionism, healthcare professionals may be more affected by feelings of guilt when they interpret errors as individual failures and seek zero tolerance for errors.
Appraising the Situation
Experiencing Stress and Trauma
After initial incomprehension, second victims realize their responsibility for avoidable events. 2, 35, 41, 45, 47, 49 In our model, only events associated with significant stress have further relevance. Nonstressful events can inspire either a sense of well-being (good luck) or learning. 36, 37, 42, 48 After initial nonspecific stress experience (e.g., shock), second victims respond rather physiologically or rather psychosocially. [33] [34] [35] 41, [47] [48] [49] [50] Physically, common symptoms range from sleep disturbance to muscular tension. 2, 34, 35, 39, 42, 44, 45, [47] [48] [49] [50] Psychosocial responses are characterized by a sense of damaged personal integrity 33, 34, 36, 38, 39, 41, 44, [46] [47] [48] 50 : "Nurses expressed feelings of guilt because they felt that they had oppressed or betrayed someone who had needed them and had trusted them with his or her life. "
41(p5)
Having participated in a serious adverse event, second victims' experience severely conflicting emotions: having caused suffering, some feel they should suffer [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] 44, [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] ; having suffered trauma, many experience anxiety and panic, with potential health consequences.
2,34-36,38,41,44-47,49,52 A broad variety of anxieties of second victims are related both to the harm of first victims and to their own situation as second victims, e.g., anxiety to loss of trust and legal consequences. 2, 34, 35, 41, 42, [44] [45] [46] [47] 49, 50 In addition, feelings of inadequacy, uncertainty, and reduced selfconfidence often arise. 2, [33] [34] [35] [36] 38, 39, 41, [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] Other consequences can include flashbacks, burnout syndrome, depression, and suicidal thoughts. 2, 34, 38, 41, 42, [45] [46] [47] 49, 50 On a personal level, psychosocial responses swing between anger-frustration and regret-repentance; on a professional level, reduced performance can manifest as efficiency deficits or defensive decision-making. 2, [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] 41, 42, 45, 47, 49, 50 Unlike normal stressful events, second-victim experiences include incisive trauma, with effects extending beyond initial stress responses and leaving a profound impression at both private and professional levels. 2, [33] [34] [35] [36] 38, 41, 42, [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] Restoring Integrity
Understanding and Acting
Second victims need an internally and externally motivated (e.g., by superiors) restoration of integrity. 2, 33, 34, 38, 43, 47, 50 The emotion-and event-oriented process of acting on traumatic experience can be rather constructive or rather destructive. Focusing on understanding and acting, its aim is to achieve a return to work as soon as possible, with regained self-esteem. n = 17; physicians; n = 11; midwives: n = 3), having been directly involved in patient safety events resulting in deaths (n = 14), serious harm (n = 9), short-term harm (n = 7) or no harm (n = 1 A discursive process combining reconciliation/forgiveness with coping with imperfection has proved key to returning to professional life. 34, 35, 37, 38, 43, 47 Repressive mechanisms, e.g., rationalization, self-punishment, minimalization, are destructive emotion-oriented responses to adverse events; more constructive emotion-oriented strategies, e.g., disclosing the event to the first victim often receive high priority but can have complex outcomes [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] : "Although they were comforted when the family forgave them or grieved alongside them, surgeons also recognized difficulty with these interactions. "
38(p1184)
Many second victims wish to apologize to their corresponding first victims but received lawyers' recommendations to maintain silence. 35, 40, 43, 44 For some, disclosing the event results from a process of consideration. 34, 35, [37] [38] [39] 41, 43, 46, 47, 49 Depending on the level of harm and "real" error, second victims may disclose varying degrees of detail. 34, 35, 37, 38, 41, 43, 46, 47, 49 In this respect, along with events that cause harm with potential legal consequences, wellknown events are favorable for disclosure; unknown error events, as well as anxiety and minor length of service on the part of the second victim, are unfavorable. 35, 37 Although minimalization is a rather destructive task-oriented way of dealing with an event, constructive task-oriented strategies, e.g., learning, rank among the most helpful. 2, [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] 47, 49, 50 In the short term, second victims strive to reduce harm in first victims and to restore medical stability 34, 36, 41, 44 ; in the medium term, they wish to participate in RCA to prevent recurrences of their experiences and to optimize the system, e.g., via error prevention programs 2, [34] [35] [36] [38] [39] [40] 42, 43, 45, [48] [49] [50] ; and in the long term, it is necessary to extend perspectives toward fallibility. 35, 41, 43 Expressions of this include improvement-oriented behavior patterns, increased mindfulness with regard to imperfectness, and self-care, as well as increased patient centricity. 2, 34, 38, [42] [43] [44] [45] 47, 50 Continuing Professional Work
Finding Meaning
Traumatic second-victim experience also has a long-term existential effect on professional life. 47 Re-evaluation and perceived meaning can both support private and professional improvement of the situation. 43 Whereas second victims with serious professional doubts may change their positions or leave their profession, some second victims continue their profession lives with unimpaired performance despite a trajectory of burden and reduced work satisfaction (surviving). 2, 33, 37, 38, 45, 47, 49, 50 Most desirably, thriving can follow a positive turn of a traumatic experience, characterized by enhanced expertise and an evolved personality. 2, 34, 38, 43, 45, 46 Both can manifest in improved handling of complexity and uncertainty, as well as in a revised view of oneself and the world. Second victims who have regained their self-confidence see themselves as imperfect, but good healthcare professionals 34, 38, 43, 45, 46 : FIGURE 3. Transactional second-victim experience (author's own chart). Icon legend is based on the International Organization for Standardization (1985) .
"[in] < the humble expert > … physicians described learning to temper their expertise with humility and learning to have confidence without being cocky. "
43(p240)
Metasummary
As Table 3 shows, all included studies contributed to one or more of three categories: safety culture, appraising the situation, and restoring integrity; 58% contributed to all categories. 2, [33] [34] [35] 37, 38, 42, 43, 46, 49, 50 The median contribution of each study was 5%; the most recent and the oldest were most influential.
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DISCUSSION
This qualitative metasynthesis highlighted, described, and interpreted second-victim experiences in acute-somatic settings. Based on 19 qualitative studies, the main outcome is a model of transactional second-victim experience. Including the central stages of appraising the situation, restoring integrity, and continuing professional life, this experience is moderated by safety culture and healthcare professionals. The model finds its theoretical foundation in Lazarus' model of stress, 19 as well as in Antonovsky's "sense of coherence." 20 Against the background of a primarily physiological experience, 3 we assumed that supporting a person to restore their integrity could prevent long-term pathological consequences. There is some evidence, which support from peers and superiors can have a protective influence on burnout. 53 A prospective longitudinal study showed that, in the context of serious adverse events, assistant physicians have significantly increased burnout scores and a threefold elevated risk of depression. 54 Scott et al (2015) 55 reaffirmed that safety culture can be both a key factor of support and a measurable end point. In addition to the wish of second victims for cultural change and learning needs, the authors emphasized the importance of communication with first victims, support by peers and superiors, and external emotional support as factors of a positive safety culture. These factors are congruent with safety culture features described elsewhere. 56 An organization's treatment of second victims reflects its safety culture and represents an important aspect of socialization. Ideally, adverse events offer team learning opportunities. Regarding organizational support and underscoring the importance of results from Burlison et al. (2016) , 57 alongside absenteeism, their results associate intention to abandon one's workplace significantly with the support of peers and superiors. Peer support is the strongest predictor of second victims' recovery, 57 and Edrees et al. (2016) 58 observed that recovery can be improved and promoted via institutionalized telephone support from colleagues. However, the current results support the literature's indications that collegial readiness to support second victims can be limited 59 : barriers to support programs' use include missing knowledge about their availability and doubts regarding their reliability. 58, 60, 61 After the initial stress response, the second victim's appraisal of the situation is influenced by feelings of guilt and reduced professional performance. In systematic reviews, guilt was those most frequently reported emotional response.
12,14, 16 The current results concerning second victims' efficiency deficits and tendencies toward defensive decision-making confirm the thesis regarding reciprocity of error involvement, posttraumatic stress response, and endangered patient safety due to reduced professional performance. 3 Disclosing the event relates significantly to reducing guilt feelings and can contribute to restoring ones sense of integrity; however, disclosure only occurred in a third of cases. 62 The present metasynthesis described disclosure as a process of consideration, which is also expressed in a just recently published "qualitative systematic review" (n Studies = 9) using the Joanna Briggs Institute meta-aggregation approach about second-victim experiences of predominantly female nurses, which describes disclosing as a dilemma. 63 Reasons for forgoing disclosure include fear of legal consequences, deficient communication skills, and inadequate support. 62 Interprofessional skill training could overcome missing communication skills; this would benefit the second victim by increasing the chances of the first victim directly forgiving them. 62, 64, 65 According to the outlined potential of disclosing adverse events on the recovery of second victims, it is necessary to establish guidelines and structures that promote, instead of often selective, full disclosure; this as a strategy not only to reduce liability damages but also to meet ethical obligations to first and second victims. [66] [67] [68] [69] This metasummary on the one hand offers comprehensive state of knowledge regarding safety culture, situational appraisal, and restoring integrity. On the other hand, it illuminates knowledge gaps concerning destructive forms of dealing with the event. This knowledge gap may result from an underlying selection bias of included studies. It is possible that only second victims with predominantly constructive strategies for dealing with adverse events are recruited for studies, because others are unavailable because of changing their profession. However, especially during a deepening skills shortage, further knowledge should be obtained by identifying the perspectives of colleagues who support second victims. 70 Not disclosing an event proved to be the most frequent defensive coping strategy in the review by . 14 
Limitations
To the authors' knowledge, the current model offers the first conceptual framework to understand second-victim experience across professions and cultures. Despite efforts to ensure reliability, the results should be seen in the context of two major limitations. For the most part, only one person evaluated the methodological quality of included studies and coded the data of only German and English articles in German. In addition, being three times removed from direct experience may have diminished the results' credibility during interpretation.
CONCLUSIONS
The newly developed model works for the first time systematically from the second-victim perspective based on qualitative studies including majoritarian physicians and nurses. This perspective should increasingly be applied to daily practice to promote institutional safety culture. As a platform upon which to refine policies fostering professional development and preservation, the new model contributes ultimately to patient safety.
Implications for Practice
Many organizations are unprepared for serious adverse events. 71 The need for hospitals to conceive second-victim experience as a clinical emergency and to prepare accordingly is emphasized. 48 Our results indicate that hospital safety culture affects not only patients but also healthcare professionals. Therefore, safety culture can provide a path to support second victims in restoring their integrity. These results indicate a scope for integrating second victims in RCA, in the elaboration and implementation of recommendations for event disclosure to first victims, in ensuring a trustful approach to superiors, in learning from a systemic viewpoint, and in communicating existing support programs. Although the effectiveness of RCA in learning from errors and preventing recurrences can be questioned, RCA has the potential to relief burdens of affected healthcare professionals at the sharp end due to insights in the systematic emergence of adverse events.
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Implications for Education
Stakeholders in education should meet second victims' request for a culture prepared for adverse events. One central prerequisite would be curricular integration of the second-victim experience on all levels of healthcare professional education. In this regard, definitions and descriptions of factors triggering second-victim phenomena, consequences, theoretical frameworks, support systems, and barriers to support are all relevant. 74 The secondvictim transactional model can support curriculum development, transmit a valid knowledge base, and contribute to socialization in dealing with human fallibility.
Implications for Research
According to the current knowledge concerning safety culture, appraisal of adverse event situations, and restoration of integrity, further research should focus on developing and implementing effective supportive interventions. Therefore, the model of transactional second-victim experience provides a valid knowledge base and promotes the integration of the affected persons' perspectives. Investigating the effectiveness of supportive interventions and examining the problem vis-à-vis payers will require development and evaluation of culture-specific instruments to assess secondvictim experience including support. For practical use, an instrument such as that by Burlison's et al. (2017) 75 could facilitate discussions and supportive approaches. To ensure targeted support in the early, it should differentiate between second-victim experience and burnout or depression. The newly developed transactional model of second-victim experience will contribute to this.
